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In disaster management, opportunities occur where you make them, and the 
best way to make opportunities is through disaster preparedness. For many 
years, preparedness was viewed only in terms of emergency response, that is, 
the reaction to a pending emergency and the activities that would take place 
in the immediate aftermath. Thus, preparedness concentrated on developing 
warning and evacuation procedures and limited steps (such as stockpiling) that 
would speed material aid. A more sophisticated approach is now being taken 
and typical preparedness activities include predetermination of effective 
strategies and appropriate modes of involvement, development of tools needed 
by the emergency staff, development of plans for the actual response, and 
training for crisis operations. Generally, opportunities for improving the 
whole range of response, in all phases of a disaster and at all levels of the 
relief system, are beginning to be exploited.
Concisely stated, the objectives of preparedness are to protect lives and 
property from an immediate threat, to promote rapid reaction in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster event, and to structure the response to both the 
emergency and longer-term recovery operations. Modern disaster preparedness 
is based on the realization that disasters are no time to be trying to figure 
out what to do, and that the most rational and logical course of action can be 
predetermined and planned.
Preparedness is concerned with activities that occur immediately before a 
disaster (such as warning and evacuation), during the disaster (such as main­
taining communications, protection of critical facilities and lifelines), and 
immediately following the disaster (including search and rescue, disaster 
assessment, evacuation and treatment of injured persons, security in the dis­
aster-affected area, restoration of lifelines and critical facilities which 
may have been damaged by the disaster, and further evacuation of areas threat­
ened by secondary disasters).
^Preparedness is normally seen as an activity of the planning and engi“ 
neeringdisciplines as well as medical, social and security services. Practical 
experience has shown that the best groups to assume responsibility for pre­
paredness are operational agencies. For governments, this means ministries 
that have their own communications and transport, as well as administrative 
facilities (for this reason, preparedness is often left to the military or 
paramilitary organizations such as civil defense agencies). Appropriate min­
istries or other "operational'1 agencies.
1. CONCEPTS IN PREPAREDNESS
As in mitigation, preparedness activities can be divided into passive and 
active categories. The more traditional activities that are usually associated 
with preparedness (including the preparation of disaster manuals, stockpiling 
of relief goods, and the development of computer lists of resources and per­
sonnel) are usually considered passive in nature. Active measures include de­
velopment of comprehensive response plans, monitoring of threatening events 
(such as hurricane tracking or stream level monitoring), training of emergency 
personnel, and development of the tools and methods needed for emergency re­
sponse.
Disaster warning and evacuation measures are usually categorized as 
active preparedness measures although, in fact, they can also be classified as 
an initial response to a disaster threat.
2. ELEMENTS OF PREPAREDNESS PLANNING
Preparedness planning borrows from both mitigation and relief program 
planning procedures. First, the risk areas are determined and mapped; then 
vulnerable settlements are identified. Next, the responses that would be 
possible in the event of a disaster are examined. Then, the resources nec­
essary to react are estimated, and the deficiencies are listed.
Once this information has been gathered, a preparedness plan is devel­
oped. This includes six steps:
A. Determination of the objectives to be met in each affected 
sector.
B. Determination of the strategies and approaches necessary to 
accomplish these objectives and to plug any gaps that have been 
identified.
C. Development of an implementing instrument. This is usually 
in the form of a Disaster Preparedness Plan, a formal document 
which sets out the sequence of activities and the responsibilities 
of each participant in the response activities.
The purpose of the disaster preparedness plan is to place 
all activities in a comprehensive framework so that they can be 
executed in an orderly, sequential, and complementary manner.
Normally, activities are divided into increments so that resources 
can be marshalled at each critical place and stage, and disaster 
managers can concentrate on the most critical activities at the ap­
propriate time.
Preparedness plans are normally set forth as formal documents.
Plans for a small agency or community may be comprised of no more 
than a brief checklist and description of activities, with the as­
signment of responsibilities noted on the margins; while a national 
preparedness plan may include a series of documents, including net­
work diagrams and flow charts of activities, subplans (known as 
emergency action plans) for each sector, department and/or agency, 
scores of checklists and emergency procedures to be followed, along 
with a statement of policies. Whatever form a plan follows, it is 
important that it be written down, both to serve as a reference and 
to ensure that no activities are forgotten in the haste of the disaster.
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To be successful as an implementing instrument, an emergency pre­
paredness plan must meet the following requirements:
(1) It must present the sequence of activities in a logi­
cal and clear manner.
(2) It must be comprehensive and balanced.
(3) It must assign specific tasks and responsibilities 
for each task.
(4) It must link appropriate organizations and establish 
mechanisms to bring people and organizations together at 
the critical points.
(5) It must reflect the policies of the implementing agen­
cies or the national government in a disaster.
D. Development of the tools necessary to effect response and im­
plement the plan.. Preparedness tools include:
(1) Establishment of communications networks
(2) Transport capabilities
(3) Localized action plans
(4) Procedures and checklists
(5) Establishment of evacuation routes
(6) Acquisition and strategic placement of search and 
rescue equipment.
E. Strategic placement of resources to be used in the response. 
For most agencies, this means stockpiling* or working out relation­
ships with suppliers to enable rapid acquisition and delivery of 
needed relief materials. Other activities may include:
(1) Establishing lists of materials, personnel and 
other resources;
(2) Establishment of contingency reserves of funds.
*For the international relief agencies, stockpiling has become a much 
debated topic, with many critics pointing out that stockpiling is only 
of limited benefit unless carried out in-country. (See "Issues in 
Disaster Preparedness" later in this paper).
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F. Training and drilling are the final elements of preparedness.
A preparedness plan and the tools of preparedness are of little 
value unless people know how to use them effectively. Effectiveness 
is enhanced first by training, which is the introduction of person­
nel to the plan and the sequence of activities, as well as to the 
tools and resources, and instruction on how to use each productively. 
Drill includes practice activities designed to both routinize each 
activity (and thereby help reduce time of response) and to help identify 
the bottlenecks and ''debug*' the system. Major disasters, gratefully, 
occur infrequently. Between disasters, people and institutions 
change, and it is easy for gaps to develop and for people to forget 
what has been set out in the plan. Periodic review and drill is the 
only practical way of keeping preparedness activities fresh in every­
one's mind and adapting the plan to changing organizational struc­
tures and changing needs. (An innovative method of keeping the pre­
paredness plan up-to-date has been formalized in Sri Lanka. Each 
year at the beginning of the cyclone season, the government holds a 
"Cyclone Awareness Day". On that day, each government department 
and non-governmental institution with a disaster assignment is re­
quired to review and update its plan and send a notice of any changes 
to the central disaster coordinating office). In many countries, it 
is normal practice for critical facilities (such as hospitals and 
power-generating facilities) to conduct periodic disaster drills 
which are analyzed to determine what changes need to be made in the 
disaster plan.
Without constant drill and training, disaster preparedness ef­
forts will come to naught. Recently, a small island nation, which 
had been struck by heavy flooding, decided to establish a prepared­
ness plan. After several months of painstaking efforts, the new 
plan was prepared and submitted to the government. Only after it 
was adopted was it learned that a similar plan had been prepared 
twenty-five years earlier in response to flooding in the same lo­
cation. Because there had been no provision for drill or updating, 
it had been forgotten over the years.
3. COMMON PROBLEMS IN PREPAREDNESS
A general review of preparedness planning and an assessment of response 
activities.carried out under the direction of preparedness plans has in­
dicated a number of common problems, such as:
A. Overcentralization of authority and failure to delegate 
authority to local levels.
B. Failure to adequately sequence post-disaster activities.
C. Failure to fully structure the emergency response and re­
sponse actions in the transition phase.
D. Over-reliance on electronic communications, especially tele­
phones .
E. Failure to build in flexibility and an ability to respond to 
changing situations.
F. Failure to plan adequate and appropriate disaster assessment 
measures.
G. Overemphasis on speed of delivery of material aid rather than 
on the process of determining actual needs and priorities.
H. Failure to determine appropriate mechanisms for delivering aid 
at the appropriate periods.
I. Failure to establish methods for terminating or diverting in­
appropriate aid.
J. Failure to plan adequate protection of critical facilities.
K. Placing responsibility for preparedness planning in the wrong 
ministry.
L. Overemphasis on relief activities (as opposed to search and 
rescue, protection of critical facilities, etc.)
In the implementation of preparedness plans, there have been additional 
problems in that preparedness agencies often fail to fully involve local 
people and existing coping mechanisms in planning and training activities.
4. ISSUES IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
A. Stockpiling
Critics point to the fact that the distribution of relief sup­
plies rests more on human than technological factors, and that the 
ability to move materials rapidly between Europe or North America 
and developing countries is of little consequence if it cannot be 
distributed rapidly once it arrives. Another issue is the appropri­
ateness of the aid that is stockpiled. While there is no doubt that 
some equipment, tools and resources are helpful in disasters, much 
of the aid that is traditionally stockpiled is of little real value 
to the disaster victims (despite the fact that they may stand in line 
for hours to receive it).
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Tents and emergency shelter items are among most debated cases. 
As an alternative to tents, some relief strategists have proposed 
that stockpiles of building materials, especially roofing sheets, 
be placed near threatened communities. Others argue that, if an 
agency has the capability to stockpile materials in this manner, it 
makes little sense to withhold them until a disaster strikes, es­
pecially when they could be useful in improving the safety of the 
existing buildings. They feel that money is better spent on vul­
nerability reduction than on stockpiling.
The answer to the stockpiling question probably lies somewhere 
in between all the arguments. Stockpiling can be effective, espe­
cially if it is carried out in the country, and there are certainly 
some materials and resources that are required in every disaster* 
investment in which it is difficult for a poor country to justify 
in lieu of other priorities. Medical supplies and equipment espe­
cially are costly and often have a short shelf life; thus, it 
probably makes sense for these to be stockpiled and provided by the 
international relief system. Donors should be careful, however, to 
ensure that the aid provided is appropriate and that the ability to 
stockpile does not result in the transfer of these materials at in­
appropriate times or in such a way as to block the transport of more 
critical items.
B. Community Shelters
A preparedness issue that often arises is the question of pro­
viding large shelters for persons living in communities or areas 
.threatened by cyclonic storms. Much of the traditional preparedness 
literature advises officials to designate churches, schools or other 
large buildings as community shelters to which people can flee when a 
storm approaches. Proponents often point to similar practices in the 
United States. While this practice has been fairly successful in the 
United States, there are two serious drawbacks to using this approach 
in developing countries.
(1) The question of wind resistance. In the U.S., the 
buildings which have been designated as shelters were 
especially designed or reinforced to withstand hurricane- 
force winds. The designation of similar large-scale 
buildings in developing countries is practical only if 
they meet the same design criteria and standards as the 
U.S. buildings. However, most buildings in the Third 
World have not been designed to meet these standards, and 
many of the larger buildings are, in fact, more unstable 
in high winds than many of the surrounding houses. The 
record of these buildings when used as shelters is alarming.
In Andhra Pradesh, following the cyclone in 1977, three 
buildings (churches and schools) failed with a total loss 
of over 400 lives. In Dominica, some experts attribute the 
relatively low loss of life in Hurricane David (1979) to 
the fact that there was not enough warning for people to 
get to the churches which were designated as hurricane 
shelters. Of the six main churches, four were totally de­
stroyed.
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(2) Designating any building in a low lying or flood- 
prone area as a shelter. Hurricanes can propel storm 
surges, popularly known as tidal waves, dozens of kilo­
meters inland with such awesome force that no building 
is safe. Even if the building does survive the pounding 
of the wave action, the water may rise as high as 10 
meters, entirely covering one and two-story buildings.
Every building used as a community shelter in the coastal 
area of Andhra Pradesh which was struck by the surge of 
the 1977 cyclone was submerged by the surge. In 14 
buildings to which people had fled for protection, there, 
were no survivors.
Thus, even if buildings are specially designed or 
reinforced as shelters, there would still be a danger.
There are other practical issues involved in the question of 
coastal storm shelters. In rural areas, it would be difficult and 
cost-prohibitive to build a single large structure to house all the 
people in a particular region, and it is unlikely that shelters 
could be distributed widely enough to be close to all threatened 
families. Furthermore, the success of shelters would still be de­
pendent upon adequate warning and evacuation systems. Unless an 
adequate early warning system were developed, people in riverine 
environments or on islands would be unable to get to the shelters 
in the first place. If these systems can be developed, they should 
not be oriented to encourage people to remain in the area, but 
rather to encourage all the people to get to safe areas.
What then is the alternative? Most experts concur that the best 
measure is adequate warning and evacuation of the threatened area.
They argue that in areas along the coast, especially those where pos­
sible storm surges could occur, no steps should be taken which would 
encourage people to remain. They stress that, since the technology 
is now available to track cyclonic storms, more emphasis should be 
placed on public information and awareness activities which would 
encourage people to take evasive action when a storm warning is 
posted. This should be accompanied by construction of evacuation 
routes and reception centers for evacuees.
C. Centralization Versus Decentralization
One of the management issues that arises in disaster prepared­
ness is the question of how much centralization of authority is re­
quired . for the effective administration of preparedness and emergency 
response activities. When emergency preparedness was a new topic, 
little was known about a society's response to a disaster, and it was 
assumed that people confronted by disaster would be panicky and would 
react to the threat with unusual behavior. It was believed that a 
strong central office with ultimate authority and power would be the 
most effective way of controlling the situation and keeping the social 
fabric together. Krimgold has written:
■
"Emergency is often used to justify changes in 
the ordinary procedures for making decisions. It 
provides an excuse which allows national authorities 
to decide national questions. In the name of emer­
gencies, property can be confiscated, people can be 
forced to leave their homes and democratic processes 
can be circumvented.*
The other danger is that, in order for a highly centralized bu­
reaucratic system to work, it must have a pyramidal and hierarchical 
administrative framework. In hierarchical bureaucratic systems, there 
is a loss of information as it is transferred from level to level and 
when presented as a basis for consideration, it may bear little rele­
vance to the original data gathered.** Furthermore, such a system is 
dependent on the functioning of the central office. If that is dam­
aged or communications are severed, the whole system will break down.
Our increasing understanding of disaster response by societies 
indicates an alternative approach to management and argues the case 
for decentralization. If the goal is for disaster assistance to be 
compatible and "in phase" with actions that are occurring within the 
community, preparedness activities and decision-making should also be 
community-based in origin and concept. It would be difficult for a 
national or even regional disaster plan to take into account all the 
local variations found at the community level. Decentralization is 
important because it allows for localized variations in culture, com­
munity and need. Thus, "the shortest possible distance between the 
people who make decisions and the people who are subject to the re­
sult of those decisions should be maintained."***
This is not to say that there is not a need for a central co­
ordinating body for preparedness activities (which should be endowed 
with a degree of authority) for such an organization can ensure that 
there is minimal overlap in the provision of services and that all 
assistance is provided on an equitable basis (if given the proper 
working tools, such as uniform assistance policies). The role of the 
central office is to coordinate resources outside the community and 
help meet the needs identified by the local plan.
*Krimgold, Frederick, The Role of International Aid For Pre-disaster 
Planning in Developing Countries, Avdelningen for Architektur, KTH, 
Stockholm, 1974, Page 58.
' k ' k Op. Cit. Krimgold, p. 60.
Op. Cit. Krimgold, p. 60.
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D. Use Of Defense-Oriented Agencies In A Civil Disaster Role
In many countries, responsibility for civil disaster prepared­
ness is placed in the hands of agencies that are either a formal 
part of the defense ministry or borrow heavily from military organi­
zations. This is a reflection of common practices in the U.S. and 
European countries during the 1950?s and 60's. During the Cold War, 
many of the industrialized nations built extensive civil defense net­
works to respond to civilian needs in the event of nuclear attack. 
Responsibility for coordinating civil defense activities was normally 
placed in the hands of military or para-military organizations. As 
tensions lessened in the 1960fs, it was decided to expand the port­
folio of these organizations to include a variety of civil disasters 
and to integrate the resources (which include warning devices, shel­
ters, food suppliers, and search and rescue equipment) into municipal 
and state preparedness activities. (In the United States, the change 
is reflected in the progressive name changes from Civil Defense to 
Civil Defense Preparedness Agency).
There are a number of advantages to using the military in a 
civil disaster role. Usually, the military has an excellent com­
munications system which is highly mobile. Units of soldiers can 
operate self-sufficiently for several days at a time and have ac­
cess to vehicles and heavy equipment that is useful in many disaster 
roles. Furthermore, the military usually acts in an orderly and dis­
ciplined manner, which can have major psychological advantages in a 
chaotic situation.
On the other hand, there are a number of problems associated with 
"over-reliance ou the military. First, military units are not suited 
to long-term disaster roles. Very few commanders are willing to 
allow their troups or key personnel to devote extensive time to non­
defense related activities for longer than several weeks. Thus, or­
ganizations that are dependent upon the military in key sectors must 
necessarily limit their involvement to the emergency period.
A second problem is that an organization or activity tends to de­
sign its method of operation around the key participants. Thus, if 
the military assumes the major role in disaster response, response 
activities will reflect military capabilities. A subtle example of 
this is the emphasis on the use of tents as emergency shelter units. 
Because military organizations already have the units and can quickly 
erect them, few alternatives are sought.
Another example is the erection of tent camps for evacuees. In 
setting up the camps, military engineers will naturally use their own 
base planning procedures and lay the camps out along military lines, 
similar to those used for army camps or bivouacs. These plans are 
designed to be orderly, compact and to achieve a high density. These 
requirements are suitable for military needs, but they neglect the 
basic requirements of adequate space for families and the needs of 
special groups among the disaster victims. Furthermore, a high den­
sity may encourage the spread of disease and the development of un­
desirable social conditions within a camp, all of which can have a 
negative long-term impact on the inhabitants.
9
The third problem is precisely that which makes the military so 
desirable in the first place, that is, its highly centralized control 
system. The military hierarchy is.designed to facilitate control and 
to centralize authority. A disaster is a time when people need to get 
together and develop collective responses. A military hierarchy of 
decision-making can discourage and inhibit this process.
Another common problem is that many civil defense agencies are 
dominated by senior military officers. This is especially a problem 
when senior officers who normally hold command positions are assigned. 
This may result in the civil defense agency being subtly reformed 
into an operational arm of the military or becoming a shadow command 
designed to "take over" in a disaster.
The best answer to these dilemmas is to integrate the military's 
capacities under civilian control. The resources that are needed in 
a disaster, and that the military can easily provide, should be iden­
tified, including communications, medical services, transport, etc. 
Plans should be made to place small units under the temporary authority 
of civil officials for specific tasks. If small units are assigned, 
it will be easier for non-military authorities to manage these re­
sources and local leaders will not feel overwhelmed or threatened by 
the presence of soldiers in their community.
An effective, and non-threatening, way of integrating military 
and civil functions is to assign only officers with a technical back­
ground to civil defense agencies and, at the local level, to place 
command of military units under the authority of senior non-com­
missioned officers.
E. Technical Assistance
Much of the increased interest in disaster preparedness in the 
developing countries has been stimulated by assistance agencies of 
the industrialized countries and some of the international consortium 
of non-governmental agencies. The two most influential organizations 
involved to date are: U.S. A.I.D.'s Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance and the League of Red Cross Societies.
OFDA has taken the strongest and most valuable steps in aiding 
the development of national disaster plans. Beginning in the early 
1970's, OFDA (then.titled "Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator") began 
a series of annual seminars for representatives from disaster organi­
zations in Third World countries. Seminar participants heard pre­
sentations from noted disaster specialists and visited state and 
national civil defense agencies in the U.S. In the latter part of 
the decade, OFDA changed its approach and began holding regional 
seminars which were more closely attuned to needs in each region. 
Seminar participants were encouraged to outline and describe their 
own needs, which OFDA and other organizations could later help them 
try to meet. One very successful seminar was held in 1979 on St.
Lucia and resulted in the formation of a regional Caribbean disaster 
preparedness network.
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The work of the League has been influential, too, not only in 
establishing preparedness activities as a function of local Red Cross 
societies, but also as an example to other non-governmental agencies 
of what can be accomplished through preparedness. The League has 
also promoted national pre-disaster planning by asking national 
societies to encourage their governments to develop disaster plans.
Other organizations in the non-governmental sector are beginning 
to take note of pre-disaster planning possibilities. This is espe­
cially true among international voluntary agency coordinating bodies. 
For example, the World Council of Churches has recently begun to 
undertake preparedness activities and to encourage its member churches 
to do likewise. World Vision has also initiated steps along these 
lines. Very promising attempts at preparedness on the local level 
are being made by CADEC (Christian Action for Development in the Car­
ibbean), under a special Disaster, Emergency Relief and Welfare 
Committee supported by technical assistance from Church World Services, 
OXFAM, and Catholic Relief Services.
Because the profession of disaster preparedness is relatively 
new, there are a number of recurring problems associated with the pro­
vision of technical assistance in the development of emergency pre­
paredness plans which can be identified. First, is the problem of 
selecting an appropriate model for the emergency preparedness plan.
Often a standard model (or models) based on systems used in indus­
trialized countries is suggested as a base from which local deri­
vatives can be developed. Most of die models are based on plans de­
veloped in or for the industrialized countries. These plans, which 
may stress a heavy reliance on highly technical or capital-intensive 
equipment and resources, are often inappropriate for developing 
countries.
Although in any preparedness plan there will be recurring organi­
zational, operational and staffing patterns, it is clear that each 
country or organization requires a unique combination of these elements. 
Models developed by each country should represent a mechanism which 
best meets the needs and capabilities of that country and reflects the 
material and human resources available. The development of models for 
universal use obscures development and use of local resources. "Con­
structing models based on the characteristics of the most wealthy and 
technologically advanced nations must be avoided. The danger of such 
models is that they lead less developed societies to overlook their 
own indigenous resources in developing incremental improvements in 
their disaster preparation, thereby becoming more dependent on out­
side assistance.*
Charles Fritz, "Report on the 1970 A.I.D. National Disaster Preparedness 
Training Seminar," Washington, D.C., 1971.
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A second set of problems associated with preparedness assist­
ance is due to the question of emphasis. More often than not, tech­
nical aid has concentrated only on relief, especially that provided 
by the international donor community. In fact, it has been pointed 
out that in certain cases, preparedness assistance has seemed to be 
more actively designed to facilitate aid by international donors 
than to focus on the response capability of the disaster-affected 
community. To be effective, technical assistance should concentrate 
on the full range of preparedness needs and activities.
The best means of overcoming many of these problems is to make 
a subtle shift in emphasis. Instead of concentrating on the adoption 
of specific models or plans, technical assistance should be aimed at 
providing a conceptual framework within which an organization can 
review the options and develop its own approach and structure. While 
it is not possible to design a preparedness model or disaster plan 
which can be adapted to all situations and environments, it is pos­
sible to develop a process which will result in the taking of ap­
propriate measures that will be adequate for most situations. Tech­
nical assistance can support local efforts by providing access to 
resources and information that will facilitate preparedness and re­
sponse activities. By bringing people together to discuss common 
issues, problems and experience, measures such as the U.S.A.I.D. 
Disaster Preparedness Seminars can have a beneficial impact on pre­
paredness activities.
F. Planning The Political Elements
One of the most frequently overlooked aspects of pre-disaster 
planning is the political element. When a major disaster occurs, 
the prime minister or president of the nation will naturally want to 
demonstrate his concern and interest in the situation by taking per­
sonal steps to assist. In many countries, a personal representative 
is designated to be charge of relief or reconstruction functions 
reporting directly to the chief of state. In some cases, this has 
led to the formation of entirely new disaster response teams and the 
circumvention of the networks establishing through disaster prepared­
ness.
In non-governmental agencies, this problem also exists. If a 
disaster is of an immense magnitude, the head of an organization 
often feels compelled to visit the scene and make some personal in­
put. Many field directors have seen their carefully developed 
programs altered or ended before they got off the ground by one of 
these "state visits" when the chief of the organization demanded 
quick action and/or key changes based on his assumption of what is 
necessary in a disaster.
It is quite logical, and indeed proper, that chief executives 
demand some degree of personal involvement. For disaster prepared­
ness, however, the problem is that the intervention of this nature 
by persons who are not a part of the pre-disaster planning process 
can slow, complicate, or even erase painstaking preparedness and 
mitigation efforts.
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